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Abstract The decision of the House of Lords in R v Kennedy (No. 2)1 was
welcomed by many academics as a return to the traditional application of
causation. The victim in Kennedy was found to have broken the chain of
causation between himself and his drug supplier when he self-injected
with an already prepared syringe and produced his own death. However,
on a careful examination of the law, can the rationale behind Kennedy be
supported? This article explores Kennedy’s unconventional relationship
with the doctrine of causation and casts a critical eye over the application
of the doctrine in ‘fright and flight’ and ‘victim’ cases. There appears to be
no correlation between the judgment in Kennedy and the well-established
causal principles of foreseeability and novus actus interveniens in the crim-
inal law. Will Kennedy end up being another Environment Agency v Empress
Car Co. Ltd?2
Keywords Causation; Self-injection; Novus actus interveniens; Sup-
ply of drugs; Unlawful act manslaughter
Unlawful act manslaughter is renowned for criminalising consequences
which were never intended or even foreseen by the defendant,3 but the
doctrine of causation has not been applied consistently in recent times.
The approach to causation may depend on the particular unlawful act
used at trial,4 and there appears to be a particularly inconsistent applica-
tion of causation in R v Kennedy (No. 2), R v Carey5 and R v Dhaliwal,6 all
of which involved an unlawful act so trivial in nature7 that the principles
of causation and foreseeability were almost impossible to apply in a way
that would be analogous to well-established cases. Where did the courts
* Lecturer in Law, Bradford University School of Management; e-mail
L.Cherkassky@bradford.ac.uk.
1 [2007] UKHL 38, [2007] 3 WLR 612.
2 [1999] 2 AC 22.
3 A view shared by D. Ormerod, comment on R v Carey [2006] Crim LR 842 at 846.
4 As seen particularly in R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] UKHL 38, [2007] 3 WLR 612. A
supply of prepared heroin led to the death of a user, but it was unlikely that the
House of Lords would deviate from previous drug-abuse cases and hold the
appellant responsible for the victim’s decision to inject. Other cases of a similar
nature include:  R v Kennedy (No. 1) [1999] Crim LR 65, R v Richards [2002] EWCA
Crim 3175, R v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 96, R v Rogers [2003] 2 Cr App R 160, R v
Finlay [2004] EWCA Crim 3868, historically, R v Cato (1976) 62 Cr App R 41, and
R v Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425.
5 [2006] EWCA Crim 17.
6 [2006] 2 Cr App R 24.
7 Or, to put it more fairly, small in significance and culpability compared to the end
result.
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in these cases go wrong and what should the courts have applied? More
importantly, what is the outcome of these inconsistent authorities?
General principles of causation should be explored. Factual causation
is easily met and merely acts as a filter, narrowing down the possible
legal causes of death. R v Dalloway8 held that it must be shown that had
the defendant acted lawfully, the harm would not have occurred.9 Legal
causation is much stricter, requiring an operating and substantial cause
of death arising from several different factors.10 A ‘substantial cause’
may contribute to the end result to a ‘significant extent’11 and must be
‘more than insubstantial or insignificant’ contribution.12 Goff LJ in R v
Pagett13 stated that it is usually enough to direct a jury simply that in law
the accused’s act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause, of
the victim’s death, it being enough that his act contributed significantly
to that result. An ‘operating cause’ requires much tighter proof that the
victim’s injuries flow directly from the defendants’ act. The popular way
to disprove that one’s actions are not an operating cause of the harm
suffered is to claim that a novus actus interveniens broke the chain of
causation.14 R v Smith15 provides good authority that only if the second
cause is so overwhelming as to make the original wound merely a part
of the history can it be said that the death does not flow from the
wound.16 Thus, a second act or injury must overtake the first as the main
and independent cause of death and there is an underlying assumption
that the defendant has no clue that the second cause is forthcoming. To
add to this a few years later, Lord Steyn in R v Latif17 said:
The general principle is that the free, deliberate and informed intervention
of a second person, who intends to exploit the situation created by the first,
but is not acting in concert with him, is held to relieve the first actor of
criminal responsibility.18
It can be taken from Latif at this point that only when a second cause is
free from the first cause and a deliberate intervention of another person
can it be said to break the chain of causation. This significant quote from
Lord Steyn will be returned to later. Taking these general causation
principles forward, Rafferty (in detail below) applied them clearly and
correctly, but other recent cases have not been so consistent.
8 (1847) 2 Cox CC 273.
9 Also see R v White [1910] 2 KB 124 where ‘but for’ the defendant’s actions the
victim would still have died.
10 See R v Mellor (Gavin Thomas) [1996] 2 Cr App R 245.
11 See Beldam LJ in R v Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670. This does not include a ‘slight
or trifling link’ as in R v Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35.
12 R v Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260, per Lord Widgery CJ.
13 (1983) 76 Cr App R 279.
14 The Latin term ‘novus actus interveniens’ was explained by Goff LJ in R v Pagett
(1983) 76 Cr App R 279 at 291: ‘. . . there has not merely been an intervening act
of another person, but an act that was so independent of the act of the accused
that it should be regarded in law as the cause of the victim’s death’.
15 [1959] 2 QB 35.
16 Ibid. at 42–3, per Lord Parker.
17 [1996] 1 All ER 353.
18 Ibid. at 364.
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Sticking to the rules: R v Rafferty
R v Rafferty (Andrew Paul)19 was an unusual case. There appeared to be a
joint enterprise20 and withdrawal from that enterprise by the defendant,
but the trial judge introduced to the jury an alternative route to convic-
tion in the form of causation. Rafferty and his co-defendants, Taylor and
Thomas, were all tried for the murder of Ben Bellamy, a 17-year-old boy
who was subjected to a violent attack on a beach before being dragged
into the sea and drowned. During the attack, which according to two
witnesses was predominantly carried out by the co-defendants by kick-
ing, punching and stamping on the victim, Rafferty supposedly elbowed
the victim in the back to keep him down and stole his debit card. On
walking away to obtain the victim’s cash, Rafferty called out to his co-
defendants ‘come on boys, leave it’ before exiting the scene. When the
defendant disappeared, his co-defendants continued their violent attack
on the victim until he was unconscious and then dragged him into
the sea. Drowning was the cause of death. The defendant returned to the
beach a short time later as planned without any money, but his co-
defendants had already left the scene and the victim had died. According
to Rafferty’s defence counsel, his co-defendants’ act of drowning the
victim was a new and fundamentally different event in the joint enter-
prise that broke any connection between the defendants’ actions and
the victim’s death. The prosecution took a stricter approach, arguing that
after his departure, the defendant remained a party to the joint enter-
prise, which encompassed the continuing use of violence by the co-
defendants on the victim, and that he had contemplated that they might
leave the victim to drown in the sea. The trial judge warned the jury that
by using the latter route to convict, the defendant would either have the
mens rea required for a secondary party to murder or he would be
acquitted. The judge probably recognised the unlikelihood of the jury
finding that the defendant foresaw that his co-defendants might intend
to cause serious harm to the victim, leading him to elaborate on the
causation argument as put forward by the defence counsel as an altern-
ative route to a manslaughter conviction.21 The causation approach—
also known as the ‘transaction principle’—was introduced by Lord Lane
CJ in R v Le Brun.22 In that case the appellant punched the victim in the
jaw before trying to carry her unconscious body home. After a segment
of time had passed, he dropped the victim on to the pavement and as a
result she suffered a fractured skull and died. The mens rea as to the harm
caused occurred when the appellant punched the victim’s jaw. This did
not cause the death. It was only at a later point did the actus reus and the
cause of death occur, which was the act of accidentally dropping the
19 [2007] EWCA Crim 1846.
20 A joint enterprise occurs when two or more parties embark on the commission of
a criminal offence together, i.e. a burglary. Each defendant is required to foresee
that their partner will commit the planned offence. See Lord Hutton in R v Powell
and English [1999] 1 AC 1 and see R v Rahman [2007] 3 All ER 396.
21 For further criticism on this point, see in R v Rafferty [2008] Crim LR 218 at 220,
comment by D. Ormerod.
22 [1992] QB 61.
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victim on to the pavement. The issue on appeal was whether the earlier
mens rea and the later actus reus could be combined as one whole
transaction. Lord Lane CJ held that a defendant could not break his own
chain of causation by covering the tracks of his earlier unlawful act:
It seems to us that where the unlawful application of force and the eventual
act causing death are parts of the same sequence of events, the same
transaction, the fact that there is an appreciable interval of time between
the two does not serve to exonerate the defendant from liability. That is
certainly so where the appellant's subsequent actions which caused death,
after the initial unlawful blow, are designed to conceal his commission of
the original unlawful assault.23
The trial judge in Rafferty directed the jury that in order to use causation
as a route to conviction they must be satisfied that: (1) the blunt force
injuries sustained by the victim which the defendant was responsible for
before his departure made a significant contribution to the death of the
victim; (2) those injuries contributed to the drowning of the victim by
either rendering him unconscious or reducing his ability to resist drown-
ing; and (3) the drowning of the victim was not such a new and
intervening act in the chain of events that it destroyed any causal
connection between the defendants’ contribution and the victim’s
death. The jury applied the causation test, and Rafferty was convicted of
manslaughter. He appealed, and the issue for the Court of Appeal was
whether the causation test as defined by the trial judge was a sufficient
basis to establish the appellants’ conviction for manslaughter.
The Court of Appeal addressed two issues. First, they found that the
appellant was a secondary party who had withdrawn from a joint
enterprise, thus applying the principles from R v Powell and English24 and
R v Rahman.25 Overturning the jury’s decision that the drowning did not
break the chain of causation, Hooper LJ stated that no jury could
properly conclude that the drowning was other than of a fundamentally
different nature to the other harm inflicted upon the deceased.26 Even
though the Court of Appeal preferred joint enterprise in Rafferty, inter-
esting points were made in its judgment about causation. The trial
judge’s directions relating to the causation test illustrate why the jury
picked the causation route to conviction:
If you are sure that the prosecution have proved the causal link between
any blunt force injuries for which Rafferty bears responsibility and the
death of Ben Bellamy and that Rafferty intended when those blunt force
injuries were inflicted that Bellamy would be caused really serious harm,
Rafferty would be guilty of murder. If you are not sure that he possessed
that intent, but you are sure that the causal link has been established,
Rafferty would be guilty of manslaughter.27
This test is easy to apply to any defendant. The jury clearly believed that
the appellant’s small action of elbowing the victim in the back did not
23 Ibid. at 68.
24 [1999] 1 AC 1.
25 [2007] 3 All ER 396.
26 [2007] EWCA Crim 1846 at [50].
27 Ibid. at [27].
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show any intention of serious harm, but it was easy to conclude that
Rafferty’s act set up a ‘causal link’ to the victim’s death. It may not have
been a good idea in this case to base an unlawful act manslaughter
conviction on such a minor causal link, because if the appellant had not
inflicted any force at all the victim would probably still have died.
Perhaps the jury recognised that Rafferty possessed some fault, but did
not wish him to get away without punishment.
The Court of Appeal secondly mulled over whether the causation
principles were appropriate for this particular case. If causation was
appropriate, how was the chain broken? Hooper LJ reached the conclu-
sion that no jury could properly conclude that the drowning of Ben
Bellamy by Taylor and Thomas was other than a new and intervening
act in the chain of events by asking himself what would have been the
proper result if the appellant had been found not to have withdrawn
when he left to go to the bank.28 In other words, assuming that the
appellant had stayed at the beach, the act of drowning the victim was
outside of the scope of the planned events and broke all causal connec-
tions between the appellant and the outcome. The Court of Appeal
recited well-known work by Professor Glanville Williams29 to illustrate
how the co-defendants could in fact break a chain of causation with
their act of drowning the victim (even when acting as part of a joint
enterprise):
If D murderously attacks a victim and leaves him for dead, when in fact he
is not dead or even fatally injured, and if X then comes along and, acting
quite independently from D, dispatches the victim, the killing will be X’s
act, not D’s, and D would be completely innocent of it. The analysis is not
changed if D was aware of the possibility or even probability of X’s inter-
vention, provided that he was not acting in complicity with X.
What can be taken from Rafferty is that a new act not contemplated by
the defendant will break the chain of causation. Ormerod argues that
the idea of introducing causation as a route to conviction in Rafferty was
‘illogical’ because once a defendant has withdrawn from a joint enter-
prise he cannot be linked to the cause of death.30 This appears to be
correct—it seems plain from the facts that the defendant’s contribution
was minimal, and once his co-defendants undertook a joint act which
was unexpected and extraordinary, the defendant carried no further
liability for the victim’s death.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill in the slightly later case of R v Kennedy
(No.2)31 described the principles discussed in Rafferty as ‘fundamental’32
when confirming in Kennedy that a free, informed and deliberate act
breaks the chain of causation. The inconsistency, however, occurs in the
foreseeability element of the intervening act. In Kennedy the victim’s
‘foreseeable’ act broke the chain of causation, directly contrasting with
the ‘unforeseeable’ approach in Rafferty.
28 Ibid. at [44]–[47].
29 Glanville Williams, ‘Finis for Novus Actus?’ [1989] CLJ 391 at 396–8.
30 R v Rafferty [2008] Crim LR 218 at 221.
31 [2007] 3 WLR 612.
32 Ibid. at 616.
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Breaking the rules: Kennedy
Simon Kennedy’s third appeal put to rest a very difficult issue in criminal
law regarding participation, assisted drug-abuse injection and causation.
It provided some clarification for the test of unlawful act manslaughter,
which is as follows: (1) the defendant committed an unlawful act;
(2) that unlawful act was a crime;33 and (3) the defendant’s unlawful act
was a ‘significant cause’ of the death of the deceased.34 Kennedy handed
a prepared syringe of heroin over to his friend Bosque and Bosque
injected himself, but later died. Kennedy was convicted of unlawful act
manslaughter on the premise that by handing over a prepared syringe
he was acting in concert with the victim in administering a noxious
thing contrary to s. 23 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. Apart
from the obvious bone of contention that it was not generally accepted
that a victim could unlawfully self-inject,35 the point of law of general
public importance in the House of Lords was whether it was appropriate
to find a person guilty of manslaughter when that person was involved
in the supply of a drug which was then freely and voluntarily self-
administered by the victim and this administration then caused the
victim’s death. The House of Lords analysed s. 23 very carefully, which
contains the following provisions:
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be
administered to or taken by any other person any poison or other destruct-
ive or noxious thing, so as thereby to endanger the life of such a person
shall be guilty [of an offence].
The House of Lords proceeded to break the provision down into three
sub-offences and went on to illustrate how the appellant could not
possibly be guilty of any of the following: (1) administering a noxious
thing to any other person (i.e. K injects V directly); (2) causing a nox-
ious thing to be administered to any other person (i.e. K causes an
innocent third party to administer the noxious thing to V); and (3)
causing a noxious thing to be taken by any other person (i.e. K causes V
to take the noxious thing directly). The House of Lords rejected
Kennedy’s culpability under sub-offences 2 and 3 of causing a noxious
thing to be administered and of causing a noxious thing to be taken
respectively, by deducing that informed adults of sound mind should be
treated as autonomous beings able to make their own decisions on how
they will act. Thus D is not to be treated as causing V to act in a certain
way if V makes a voluntary and informed decision to act in that way
rather than another.36 Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed work by
Professor Glanville Williams to support this principle:
I may suggest reasons to you for doing something; I may urge you to do it,
tell you I will pay you to do it, tell you it is your duty to do it. My efforts
33 See R v Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163, R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 at 988, and R
v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 96 at [9].
34 R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110 at 116–17.
35 R v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 96 at 100, per Keene LJ.
36 [2007] 3 WLR 612 at 616, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
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may perhaps make it very much more likely that you will do it. But they do
not cause you to do it.37
The House of Lords concluded on causation that the deceased freely and
voluntarily administered the injection to himself, knowing what it was,
and this was fatal to any contention that the appellant caused the heroin
to be administered to the deceased or taken by him. The appellant
supplied the heroin and prepared the syringe, but the deceased had a
choice whether to inject himself or not. He chose to do so, knowing
what he was doing. It was therefore the victim’s act.38 The key phrase
which leaps from the Kennedy judgment is ‘freely, voluntarily self-
administered’. Thus, if the victim has his own independent, auto-
nomous mind, then the defendant is in no way legally responsible for
the victim’s self-injection and has merely provided a ‘backdrop’ for the
victim’s act.39 Kennedy eventually fell in line with similar authorities
such as R v Dalby40 and R v Dias41 in which defendants who supplied
drugs to their victims were absolved from liability for unlawful act
manslaughter because the victims were found to have freely decided to
inject themselves with the noxious substance. The Kennedy decision is
no doubt correct and it would be futile to argue that Kennedy was the
operating cause of the victim’s death. However, the stricter application
of causation as seen in Rafferty, i.e. the foreseeability of the intervening
act is pivotal to the outcome, has not been considered in Kennedy.
Significantly, no correlation can be drawn between this case and ‘es-
cape’42 cases and ‘taking your victim as found’43 cases.
Foreseeability in causation
There are several problems surrounding the House of Lords judgment in
Kennedy in relation to foreseeability. Previous case law has not been
followed, leading to a similarity with the most controversial causation
case of all—Environment Agency v Empress Car Co. Ltd.44 Additionally,
37 Glanville Williams, above n. 29 at 392.
38 [2007] 3 WLR 612 at 618, per Lord Bingham.
39 A. Reed, ‘Causation and Assisting Drug-abuse Injection’ (2005) 69 JCL 386.
40 [1982] 1 WLR 425.
41 [2002] 2 Cr App R 96.
42 The escape (or ‘fright and flight’) doctrine allows the chain of causation to remain
intact when the victim completes the actus reus of violent offence by reacting
foreseeably to an attacker. See R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 and R v Williams
and Davis (1992) 95 Cr App R 1, in which hitchhikers in both cases jumped out of
their attackers’ cars after being unlawfully propositioned. In Roberts the victim’s
reaction was held to be foreseeable, but in Williams the victim’s reaction was held
to be unexpected and over-the-top, and the attackers in Williams were acquitted of
the victim’s death.
43 This doctrine was confirmed explicitly in R v Blaue (1975) 61 Cr App R 271, in
which the victim of an assault refused a blood transfusion to save her life because
of her religious beliefs. Lawton LJ made it clear that an attacker must accept his
victim—and all his physical and mental ailments—as he finds them and not use
them as an excuse to diminish his own liability: ‘it has long been the policy of the
law that those who use violence on other people must take their victims as they
find them. This in our judgment means the whole man, not just the physical
man’.
44 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co. (Abertillery)
Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22.
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Kennedy may have been working with his victim, thus making the
‘independent act’ from the victim very unlikely.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated in Kennedy45 that Lord Hoffmann’s
comments on causation in Empress Car Co. cannot be compared to cases
under s. 23 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (causing a
noxious thing to be administered) because they are of a wholly different
context to strict liability pollution offences.46 In Empress Car Co., the
appellant had been convicted of the strict liability offence of ‘causing’ a
river to be polluted under the Water Resources Act 1991, s. 85(1). An
unknown trespasser had entered the appellants’ premises and drained a
tank of diesel directly into a river. The House of Lords held that it had to
be proved that the defendant caused the pollution, but where the
defendant had created ‘a situation in which the polluting matter could
escape (but a necessary condition of the actual escape which happened
was the act of a third party or a natural event), the question was
whether that act or event should be regarded as a normal fact of life or
something extraordinary’.47 It is submitted that although Lord Hoff-
mann’s suggestion that only an unforeseeable and extraordinary act
should break the chain of causation is correct, his error was holding that
an unforeseeable and malicious intrusion of a stranger was a foreseeable
and ordinary act. Although Empress Car Co. involved an offence of
causing pollution to controlled waters, Empress Car Co. and Kennedy are
actually quite similar in that they have taken reverse causal approaches.
In Empress Car Co. there was an independent, intervening act which was
unforeseeable. It should have broken the chain of causation. It did not.
In Kennedy there was also an independent act which this time was
foreseeable and expected. It should have therefore not have broken the
chain of causation, but it did. Why have both Empress Car Co. and
Kennedy ignored the foreseeability element of the novus actus interveniens
doctrine?48 In Empress Car Co., the unforeseen and independent inter-
vening act did not break the chain of causation because the issue at hand
was who caused the pollution to the river. The answer was the company
who installed the waste pipe, not the third party. This has been quoted
as incorrect many times because the company who installed the waste
45 [2007] 3 WLR 612 at 617.
46 Lord Hoffmann in Empress Car Co. submitted that: (1) common-sense answers to
questions of causation will differ according to the purpose for which the question
is asked; (2) one cannot give a common-sense answer to a question of causation
for the purpose of attributing responsibility under some rule without knowing the
purpose and scope of the rule; (3) strict liability was imposed in the interests of
protecting controlled waters; and (4) in the situation under consideration the act
of the defendant could properly be held to have caused the pollution even though
an ordinary act of a third party was the immediate cause of the diesel oil flowing
into the river: [1999] 2 AC 22 at 29, 31–2 and 36.
47 [1999] 2 AC 22 at 36.
48 Lacey believes that foreseeability is irrelevant to issues of causation and should be
confined to considerations of mens rea. See N. Lacey, ‘Clean Water and Muddy
Causation: Is Causation a Question of Law or Fact, or Just a Way of Allocating
Blame?’ [1995] Crim LR 683 at 685.
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pipe did not know that an independent act would occur,49 but Lord
Hoffmann was clearly looking for the source of the pollution as opposed
to other elements which merely hurried the source along. This rationale
is interesting as it ensures that the fault of the facilitator is taken into
account as opposed to the independent party who merely took ad-
vantage of the facilitator’s thoughtlessness. If Kennedy was to follow in
the same unorthodox lines as Empress, an interesting question occurs:
should the cause of death be the heroin itself (akin to the pollution in
Empress Car Co.), or the act of injection (akin to the turning of the tap)?
Perhaps Lord Bingham in Kennedy should have applied Lord Hoffmann’s
rationale in Empress Car Co. and considered the cause of death (i.e. the
substance) as opposed to how it got into the victim? It has to be said,
applying the Empress Car Co. rationale to Kennedy reaches a much more
logical outcome: the victim with his independent act injected the
noxious substance into himself, but the source of the substance was
Kennedy. Kennedy foresaw and expected this act, and therefore he bore
some responsibility for the outcome. Some writers are inevitably torn on
this matter. Hart and Honoré argue that although there may be a
relationship between the two acts (supply and use), it would be incon-
sistent with the doctrine of free will or individual autonomy to describe
this in terms of cause and effect.50 However, Fortson and Ormerod
recognise how attractive the Empress Car Co. rationale is to drug-abuse
injection cases:
The taking of heroin would be ‘a matter of ordinary occurrence’. Any
supplier of heroin to those who were regular users would be liable in
manslaughter for their deaths. Such a result is undesirable in principle, but
we anticipate that such policy considerations might cause a court to adopt
the Empress approach to causation in the drug administration cases.51
These suggestions are no doubt controversial, and would provoke a
critical response if introduced back into the law. Kennedy is a good
illustration of one of those ‘grey area’ cases which will never sit right
with the tried principles of causation.
49 The decision was heavily criticised by a raft of academics, including Sir John Smith
(see commentary on R v Dias [2002] Crim LR 492), Professor Ashworth (described
it as ‘aberrant’ in Principles of Criminal Law, 4th edn (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 2003) 129), and by Simester and Sullivan as involving ‘bad principle, bad
law, bad reasoning’ (Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 2nd edn (Hart Publishing:
Oxford, 2003) 101). Also see the note by R. Heaton in ‘Principals? No Principles!’
[2004] Crim LR 463 and R v Kennedy [2008] Crim LR 222, comment by D.
Ormerod.
50 H. L. A. Hart and T. Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Hart Publishing: Oxford,
1999) 2, commented on by T. H. Jones, ‘Causation, Homicide and the Supply of
Drugs’ (2006) 26(2) LS 139 at 141.
51 R. Fortson and D. Ormerod, ‘Drug Suppliers as Manslaughterers (Again)’ [2005]
Crim LR 819 at 826. See also Glanville Williams above n. 29 at 391. Jones, above
n. 50, points out that an interesting correlation can be drawn to smokers. It has
been observed in several recent cases that the common law requires people to live
with the legal consequences of their own choices (see McTear v Imperial Tobacco The
Times (14 June 2005) and Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] UKHL 47,
[2004] 1 AC 46).Those who continue to smoke in the knowledge that by doing so
they are damaging their health have to accept responsibility for their actions
(Badger v Ministry of Defence [2005] EWHC 2941.)
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Was Kennedy working with his victim thus making an ‘independent
act’ unlikely? A quote from Hart and Honoré was presented in the
Rafferty judgment52 to illustrate that the free, deliberate and informed
intervention of a second person, who intends to exploit the situation
created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally
held to relieve the first actor of criminal responsibility.53 This view
suggests that Kennedy and his victim would have had to produce two
acts completely separate of each other in time and purpose in order for
the second act to be considered an ‘intervention’. In the Kennedy judg-
ment itself, Lord Bingham rejected the notion that Kennedy was guilty
of causing a noxious thing to be taken by any other person (i.e. K causes
V to take the noxious thing directly) because the victim did an autonom-
ous act,54 but it can easily be argued that Kennedy and his victim were
working together. Although it has been correctly decided that there was
no joint enterprise in this case55 and that self-injection is not a criminal
offence,56 on a more basic level Kennedy and his victim were sharing a
drug habit as acquaintances and they were working together as partners
or friends for a very short time to ensure that the victim attained his
heroin. As recalled above, Lord Steyn in R v Latif57 supported the ideas
of Hart and Honoré that if the victim in Kennedy exploited the situation
created by the appellant, then the chain would not be broken because
they may be seen to be acting in concert together. It is hard to argue
that the victim’s act of self-injection was completely ‘independent’ of
Kennedy’s preparation and supply of the drug he injected. It was not a
joint enterprise in the legal sense, but a shared activity: one drug user
helping out another. Because the victim’s actions were foreseeable, it is
more logical that his and Kennedy’s acts could be combined as causes
rather than played off against one another to compete for the ‘main
cause’. In R v Cheshire58 Beldam LJ supports this idea by stating that it is
not the function of the jury to evaluate competing causes or to choose
which is dominant provided they are satisfied that the accused’s acts can
fairly be said to have made a significant contribution to the victim’s
death.59
A correlation can be found here with the case of R v Finlay.60 The
Court of Appeal in Kennedy overruled Finlay, in which the defendant was
convicted of manslaughter on the basis that he prepared a syringe and
handed it to the victim, who took it and died. The trial judge ruled that
Finlay had produced a situation in which: (a) the victim could inject
herself, (b) in which her self-injection was entirely foreseeable, and
52 [2007] EWCA Crim 1846 at [40], per Hooper LJ.
53 H. L. A. Hart and T. Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 1985) ch. 12, 326.
54 [2007] 3 WLR 612 at 616, per Lord Bingham.
55 Ibid. at 619–20.
56 On this point, see R v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 5.
57 [1996] 1 All ER 353.
58 [1991] 3 All ER 670.
59 Ibid. at 678.
60 [2003] EWCA Crim 3868.
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(c) in which self-injection could not be regarded as something extraord-
inary. The House of Lords in Kennedy argued that the principles in Finlay
conflicted with the rules on personal autonomy and the Court of Appeal
were right to overrule it,61 but the analysis in Finlay is consistent with
the doctrine of causation, particularly the well-established rules on
novus actus interveniens. The problem, of course, would be finding an
appropriate offence to pin upon Kennedy for his more-than-minimal
contribution.62 If supply was used as the unlawful act to establish a
conviction for unlawful act manslaughter (based on the theory that
Kennedy was working with the victim thus diminishing the ‘independ-
ent act’), the test could logically be applied quite easily. The test is
whether there was an unlawful act, whether that act was dangerous,
and whether that act was a significant cause of death. Supply of heroin
is an unlawful act under s. 4(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.63
‘Dangerousness’ was explained in R v Church64 as an ‘unlawful act which
must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably
recognise subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm
resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm’.65 Can it be argued that
Kennedy’s unlawful supply of ready-to-inject heroin to a drug user
would have subjected the user to some harm? A sober and reasonable
man would probably recognise that the victim would inject the prepared
syringe which contains a dangerous substance. However, the House of
Lords in Kennedy rejected the idea that an offence such as possession or
supply is applicable in assisting drug-abuse injection cases, because as
the Court of Appeal observed in R v Dalby:66 ‘the supply of drugs would
itself have caused no harm unless the deceased had subsequently used
the drugs in a form and quantity which was dangerous’.67
Applying the correct tests of causation and unlawful act manslaugh-
ter, with caution it is submitted that the deceased in Kennedy used a drug
which was dangerous in not only its form but in its quantity. This act of
61 See R v Kennedy [2007] 3 WLR 612 at [16], per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
62 ‘The connection between fault and death is too tenuous’: C. M. V. Clarkson,
‘Context and Culpability in Involuntary Manslaughter’ in A. Ashworth and B.
Mitchell (eds), Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2000) 160.
63 The facts in R v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 5 are identical to those in Kennedy. Dias
was charged with manslaughter on the premise that self-injection was an
unlawful act which he had aided and abetted, making him liable as a secondary
party for the unlawful act which caused the victim’s death. It was established on
appeal that under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 there was no such offence of
‘self-injection’ and the conviction was quashed, but Keene LJ noted that to rely on
the supply of heroin as an alternative unlawful act would raise difficulties on
causation (at [8]): ‘[The victim] was an adult and able to decide for himself
whether or not to inject the heroin. His own action in injecting himself might well
have been seen as an intervening act between the supply of the drug by the
defendant and the death of [the victim]’.
64 [1966] 1 QB 59.
65 Ibid. at 70, per Edmund Davies J.
66 [1982] 1 WLR 425.
67 Ibid. at 429, per Waller LJ.
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supply must be a significant cause of death in order to secure a con-
viction.68 It has been discussed that the independent act of the victim
was not in fact ‘wholly independent’ enough to break the chain, so this
leaves us with the question: was the supply a significant cause of the
victim’s death? Keene LJ in Dias gave some future guidance which
points towards a more generous application of the doctrine of
causation:
The trial judge in a case such as this after identifying the unlawful act on
the part of the defendant relied upon, must direct the jury to ask whether
they are sure that that act was at least a substantive cause of the victim’s
death, as well as being dangerous.69
As already discussed, a substantial cause may contribute to the end
result to a ‘significant extent’70 and must be ‘more than insubstantial or
insignificant’ contribution.71 Goff LJ in Pagett72 also stated that in law the
accused’s act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause of the
victim’s death, it being enough that his act contributed significantly to
that result.73 This is difficult to apply to the facts of Kennedy, because
even though factual causation is clearly met, the victim did inject himself
in the end, and it would be unfair to say that Kennedy was the operating
cause of the victim’s death as a result of this fact.74 The main thought to
be taken from this discussion is that the victim may not have acted as
‘independently’ as has been claimed, and Kennedy did not follow the
lucid guidance in Rafferty that an act of a ‘fundamentally different
nature’ should break the chain of causation.
Escape cases (in more detail below) and Rafferty apply the doctrine of
causation in a more traditional way which sees the element of foresee-
ability as pivotal when establishing a novus actus interveniens.
Ignoring well-established principles: R v Carey
In R v Carey75 three appellants appealed against their unlawful act
manslaughter convictions which were based on affray. Aimee Wellock,
aged 15, and her two friends were assaulted by another gang of youths.
Aimee was punched in the face by Sinead Coyle and Aimee ran away—a
distance of approximately 109 metres. Aimee said she felt faint and
68 Additionally, R v Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23 clarified that the unlawful act
does not have to be aimed at the victim, confirmed by Attorney-General’s Reference
(No. 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245.
69 [2002] 2 Cr App R 5 at [26].
70 See Beldam LJ in R v Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670. This does not include a ‘slight
or trifling link’ as in R v Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35.
71 R v Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260, per Lord Widgery CJ.
72 (1983) 76 Cr App R 279.
73 Ibid. at 291.
74 It is submitted—applying some of the rationale in Empress Car Co.—that it was not
the act of self-injection that killed the victim, because needles and injections do
not kill people. It was the heroin that killed the victim, and the heroin came from
Kennedy. Since heroin was the operating cause of death, this would logically
allow Kennedy to be a significant cause of death. Besides, is not the victim’s
voluntary decision to inject the heroin simply a foreseeable continuation of the
supply of a ready-to-inject syringe?
75 [2006] EWCA Crim 17.
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collapsed and died shortly after. The medical evidence in the case
concluded that the immediate cause of death was ventricular fibrilla-
tion, where the heart stops pumping blood to the vital organs. It was also
important to note that Aimee’s actual injuries from the assault were
relatively small—a reddening under her right eye, a bruise on the bridge
of her nose and a bruise on the back of her right ear. Aimee did have a
severely diseased heart, but both Aimee’s doctors and her family were
unaware of this. The prosecution simply argued that the appellants
(Carey, Coyle and Foster) were guilty of affray under s. 3 of the Public
Order Act 1986 and that the affray was the unlawful and dangerous act
which caused Aimee’s death. Section 3 of the 1986 Act states:
(1) A person is guilty of affray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence
towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of rea-
sonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety . . .
(2) Where 2 or more persons use or threaten the unlawful violence, it is
the conduct of them taken together that must be considered for the
purposes of sub-section (1).
The unlawful act manslaughter test was put by Dyson LJ as follows:
(i) there must be an unlawful act, (ii) that act must have been dangerous
in the sense that it subjected Aimee to the risk of physical harm, and
(iii) the unlawful act caused her death.76 Under the first criteria, it was
quickly confirmed that the unlawful act in this case was the affray as
opposed to Coyle’s single assault on Aimee. It was thought that by using
affray as the unlawful act, it was reflecting ‘the fact that this was a group
offence’.77 Ormerod agrees with this approach, believing that the totality
of the threats and violence from all present defendants against all
present victims should be aggregated ‘to represent the sufficient danger-
ous act for the manslaughter charge’.78 For the purposes of applying
unlawful act manslaughter, it may be more wise to take account only of
the individual harm inflicted upon the victim who died rather than the
general harm inflicted upon the several victims present. This way, only
the individual who has a causal link to the outcome is convicted. 
The unlawful act must also be dangerous. R v Church79 developed this
part of the test and Edmund Davies J said: 
. . . an unlawful act causing death of another cannot render a manslaughter
verdict inevitable . . . the unlawful act must be such as all sober and
reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other per-
son to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting there from, albeit not
serious harm.80
A sober and reasonable bystander must have recognised a risk of some
harm to Aimee. The House of Lords in Carey gave a lot of consideration
to this part of the unlawful act manslaughter test because the assault
upon Aimee was so trivial that it potentially could not have been
foreseen as dangerous. This aspect of the unlawful act manslaughter test
76 Ibid. at [26].
77 Ibid. at [28], per Dyson LJ.
78 R v Carey [2006] Crim LR 842 at 847, comment by D. Ormerod.
79 [1966] 1 QB 59.
80 Ibid. at 70.
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was discussed at length in R v Dawson.81 Two masked men demanded
money from a 60-year-old petrol station attendant who suffered from
heart disease. Shortly after the men fled, the attendant died from a heart
attack. Expert evidence said that the heart attack had been induced from
the shock at the armed robbery and the men were charged with man-
slaughter. Although the court admitted that injury to a person ‘through
the operation of shock emanating from fright’ could count towards
‘some harm’ under the unlawful act manslaughter test,82 the reasonable
bystander must have the same knowledge as the defendant and no
more. Since the accused in Dawson did not know that the victim had a
heart complaint, it could not be said that a reasonable bystander would
have recognised that the attempt to rob the victim in Dawson would have
subjected an apparently healthy 60-year-old man to a risk of shock
leading to a heart attack. It seems strange that the doctrine of ‘take your
victim as you find them’ from Blaue83 was not applied to the facts in
Dawson. It is submitted that the facts of Dawson are no different from the
facts of Blaue, in which the victim died as a result of a savage attack
because her religious beliefs prevented her from accepting a life-saving
blood transfusion. It was argued by the appellant in Blaue that the victim
broke the chain of causation, but Lawton LJ held that the appellant
chose his victim’s beliefs when he chose his victim and he could not
escape liability for her death. A few years after Dawson, the case of R v
Watson84 produced a more logical verdict, where an 87-year-old man
who suffered from a serious heart condition was the victim of a burglary.
Two men threw a brick through the victim’s window and shouted verbal
abuse at him before leaving empty-handed. The victim died later of a
heart attack. The trial judge directed the jury in Watson that since the
unlawful act encompassed the whole duration of the burglary, they
were entitled to ascribe to the reasonable bystander (the appellants) all
the knowledge that the appellants had gained during their entire stay in
the victim’s house. This included the fact that they had disturbed a frail,
elderly man who would likely suffer some harm through the operation
of shock emanating from fright. When highlighting this case in the Carey
judgment, Dyson LJ stated that when considering the dangerousness of
the unlawful act, it is sensible to consider the attributes of the victim.85
He confirmed that in Dawson it was unforeseeable that the 60-year-old
victim would have a heart attack, but it was foreseeable that the victim
in Watson would suffer the same fate. Aimee’s ‘shock’ leading to her
heart attack was eventually retracted from the jury’s consideration by
the trial judge because the difference between emotional upset and
shock was described as ‘a grey area’ by the trial judge and it would not
have been recognised by a sober and reasonable bystander that an
81 (1985) 81 Cr App R 150.
82 Ibid. at 156, per Watkins LJ.
83 Lawton LJ stated in R v Blaue (1975) 61 Cr App R 271: ‘it has long been the policy
of the law that those who use violence on other people must take their victims as
they find them. This in our judgment means the whole man, not just the physical
man’.
84 [1989] 1 WLR 684.
85 [2006] EWCA Crim 17 at [35].
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apparently healthy 15-year-old was at risk of suffering shock as a result
of this particular affray. Dyson LJ compared Aimee’s circumstances with
the Dawson case and supported the trial judges’ decision in the following
terms:
The reason why the death resulting from the attempted robbery of the 60
year old petrol station attendant was not manslaughter was that the
attempted robbery was not dangerous in the relevant sense. It was not
foreseeable that an apparently healthy 60 year old man would suffer shock
and a heart attack as a result of such an attempted robbery . . .even if the
affray had caused Aimee to suffer shock as opposed to emotional upset, the
affray lacked the quality of dangerousness . . . it would not have been
recognised by a sober and reasonable bystander that an apparently healthy
15 year old was at risk of suffering shock as a result of this affray.86
It is hard to argue against this rationale. How could any person have
known that Aimee was about to suffer from a fatal heart attack as a
result of a single punch? It is submitted that if consideration is to be
given to the victim’s attributes, then it should include other personal
characteristics so as to keep in line with Blaue. To ascribe only obvious
ailments to the sober and reasonable bystander is unfair in the sense that
it does not recognise the likes of Aimee as a potential candidate for a
cardiovascular complaint, and ideally the doctrine of ‘take your victim as
you find him’ should apply in cases such as Dawson and Carey. 
The trial judge in Carey also mistakenly aggregated the infliction of
violence on Aimee and both of her friends to satisfy the test of danger-
ousness. This was incorrect and it became a difficulty under the third
unlawful act manslaughter test, which requires the unlawful and dan-
gerous act to have caused the death of the victim. The trial judge directed
the jury that the prosecution must prove that the affray was a
substantial—that is to say more than an insignificant—cause of Aimee’s
death. By taking into account the violence inflicted on all three victims
as opposed to the single assault inflicted on Aimee by Coyle, the jury
were not entirely sure that the assault on Aimee was a cause of her
death when they convicted.87 The Court of Appeal conceded that be-
cause the only unlawful act against Aimee which led to physical harm
(the single punch by Coyle) did not cause her death, and because the
affray was not ‘dangerous’ in the relevant sense, none of the appellants
were guilty of manslaughter. This may have been a wasted opportunity
to apply a well-established causal doctrine. The trial judge’s directions
on causation (below)—apart from the aggregation component—were
not criticised by the House of Lords, and so it can be assumed that the
following directions are sufficient in unlawful act manslaughter: 
The blows inflicted on Aimee were not the direct cause of her death. The
medical experts base their opinion on Aimee’s history and what happened
during the incident and the closeness in time between the incident and Aimee’s
86 Ibid. at [37].
87 Section 3(2) of the Public Order Act 1986 requires an aggregation of violence if
two or more offenders commit an affray, but the aggregation permitted by s. 3(2)
is not for the purpose of making an individual participant liable for the acts and
threats of other participants.
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collapse. In their opinion it is a matter of probability Aimee did not die
spontaneously but because she had been the victim of the incident. Pro-
fessor Miloy remained of the view that it was the incident overall that caused
Aimee’s death. 88 (emphasis added)
The trial judge’s guidance seems to take a general and cumulative
approach to causation, implying that the whole incident—not just the
punch to Aimee’s face—could potentially be the cause of her death,
controversially taking into account such factors as the victim’s history
and proximity of time between the act and the death. This approach in
Kennedy would have led to a completely different outcome; any previous
drug abuse between both Kennedy and the victim—and Kennedy’s
supply of heroin—would be taken much more seriously as causes of
death.
If the single assault on Aimee had been accepted as the unlawful act
rather than the general affray (and it is submitted that this should have
been the case), then the causal issue in Carey would become identical to
that in the controversial case discussed below: when a strike to the
victim did not cause the victim’s death, could a cumulative or ‘fright and
flight’ approach to the events surrounding her death overcome the strict
causal difficulties and establish liability for manslaughter?89
Cumulative causation? R v Dhaliwal
A writer once wrote:
It is criminal homicide to cause a normal adult to commit suicide by
creating a situation so cruel and revolting that death is preferred to un-
avoidable continued submission.90
In circumstances where a person may be guilty of manslaughter by
driving another person to suicide, an unlawful and dangerous act is
difficult to find, but what is more tricky is that the unlawful ‘act’ must
cause the suicide. In the sad case of R v Dhaliwal,91 the defendant was
accused of causing the suicide of his wife through psychological injury,
which, it was argued, was sufficient to amount to ‘bodily harm’ under
ss 18, 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The
defendant had struck his wife on her forehead on the night of her
suicide, but she was mainly subject to psychological abuse over a num-
ber of years. The trial judge decided that since there was no recognised
psychiatric illness such as clinical depression or post-traumatic stress
disorder exposed by the medical experts, there could be no bodily harm.
88 [2006] EWCA Crim 17 at [39], per Dyson LJ.
89 Incidentally, because Aimee was running away from the appellants the Court of
Appeal did make a passing comment about escape cases. It was noted that there
may be circumstances where the actus reus of a crime is completed by the act of
the victim rather than the offender. However, escape was not considered in Carey
simply because Aimee’s run was to be considered as ‘a part of the whole picture’.
90 J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (Indianapolis, 1960) 274, cited by W.
Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002)
183.
91 [2006] 2 Cr App R 24.
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The Court of Appeal in Dhaliwal gave significant thought to the differ-
ence between psychological injury and psychiatric illness in criminal
law, because they did not want to be responsible for blurring the
boundaries of ‘bodily harm’. A line was drawn between diagnosed
injuries and emotional characteristics to keep in line with the well-
established authority of R v Chan-Fook (Mike)92 and the defendant was
acquitted, but what was interesting about the Dhaliwal judgment was
the lack of discussion on causation considering the vague nature of the
unlawful ‘act’. After all, if there are merely psychological taunts directed
at V over a number of years by D, it is more difficult for the purposes of
unlawful act manslaughter to establish that an unlawful and dangerous
act has caused the death of V. The trial judge in Dhaliwal believed that
the victim’s decision to commit suicide was ‘triggered’ by a physical
assault which represented a ‘culmination of a course of abusive con-
duct’, and he bravely submitted that it would be possible for the Crown
to argue that the final assault played a significant part in causing the
victim’s death:
I do not see any reason in principle why the final assault which triggered
the suicide should be looked at in isolation. If a defendant by his previous
conduct has reduced the victim to a psychological state in which the ‘last
straw which broke the camel’s back’ is liable to tip her over the edge, I
would have thought there was some force in the argument that the ‘last
straw’ played a significant part in causing the death.93
In other words, where there has been a history of physical or emotional
abuse, and a final assault from D was the ‘last straw’ triggering V’s
suicide, the final assault was a legal cause of the victim’s suicide. Re-
markably, the Court of Appeal simply stated that they would not com-
ment on the trial judge’s direction, but went on to approve his
underlying principle by submitting that it seemed likely that the assault
operated as the immediate trigger which precipitated the victim’s sui-
cide. Psychiatric evidence at trial suggested that the ‘overwhelming
primary cause’ of the victim’s suicide was the experience of being
physically abused by her husband in the context of experiencing many
such episodes over a very prolonged time. Subject to evidence and
argument on the critical issue of causation, unlawful violence on an
individual with a fragile and vulnerable personality, which is proved to
be a material cause of death, could at least, arguably, be capable of
amounting to manslaughter.94
The Court of Appeal gives support to the idea that an unlawful act
such as a strike to the head, which did not directly cause the death, may
be enough to found a conviction for manslaughter where the victim has
a ‘fragile and vulnerable personality’ on the premise that a culmination
of previous abuse is to be combined with the final unlawful act to
establish a cause. The blow to the head in Dhaliwal was an unlawful and
92 [1994] 1 WLR 689.
93 R v Dhaliwal [2006] 2 Cr App R 24—the words of the trial judge—described by Sir
Igor Judge P at [7] of the Court of Appeal judgment.
94 Surprisingly, this is the view of Sir Igor Judge P (R v Dhaliwal [2006] 2 Cr App R
24 at [6] and [8].
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dangerous act, but establishing a causal link between that remote assault
and the victim’s decision to commit suicide (and to run away as in Carey,
above) presents difficulties. The Court of Appeal is suggesting that the
causal element for unlawful act manslaughter can be met in these
circumstances if the final assault which did not cause the victim’s death
was taken into context with a history of abuse (possibly legal and
therefore not dangerous) which may have led to the victim’s decision to
die (or run away). Is the Court of Appeal suggesting under their ‘cumu-
lative and vulnerable’ approach that if C emotionally abuses V for five
years before striking her—thus causing her to commit suicide that
night—the one strike by C can be combined with a history of lawful
psychological abuse to establish a significant cause of V’s death? Surely
this defies the very nature of ‘unlawful act’ manslaughter? Cases most
similar to this suggestion are those in which a defendant must take his
victim as he finds them. In R v Blaue95 the victim made an independent
decision to refuse a blood transfusion from which she then died, and in
R v Dear96 the victim chose to reopen his stab wounds from which he
also died. One could argue that these are suicide cases like Dhaliwal in
which the defendants are still liable for the deaths of the victims despite
their victims’ free and informed decisions to die. On the other hand, the
operating causes of death in these two cases (both when the victim in
Blaue refused her transfusion and when the victim in Dear reopened his
wounds) were clearly the injuries inflicted by the defendant during a
violent and unlawful act. We would not have such a clear causal
connection in Dhaliwal (or Kennedy and Carey) because the strike upon
Mrs Dhaliwal’s head (or the supply of heroin in Kennedy or the single
punch in Carey) was not the operating cause of death. Perhaps the causal
principle in Blaue could be expanded to cover abuse victims? Lawton LJ
stated in Blaue that it had long been the policy of the law that those who
use violence on other people must take their victims as they find them.
That meant the whole man, not just the physical man. It does not lie in
the mouth of the assailant to say that his victim’s religious beliefs which
inhibited him from accepting certain kinds of treatment were unreason-
able.97 Perhaps Mr Dhaliwal should have taken his wife as he found her;
in a suicidal state prone to attempt to take her own life. It transpired
during the trial that in August 2004 Mrs Dhaliwal was admitted to
hospital after consuming a large quantity of alcohol and slitting her
wrists. This is evidence of her suicidal state of mind. The victim’s own act
of suicide will then be incidental, as the defendant assaulted and tor-
mented her knowing that she was extremely vulnerable. If, however,
legal causation will not allow strong psychological influences to play a
part in its application, there is another option in Dhaliwal and Carey to
consider when the operating cause of death is unavoidably the victim’s
own act: fright and flight (or ‘escape’) cases. These provide a more
logical approach to causation because only an unforeseeable act by the
95 (1975) 61 Cr App R 271.
96 [1996] Crim LR 595.
97 (1975) 61 Cr App R 271 at 274.
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victim breaks the chain of causation between the defendant’s act and the
victim’s injury, and even though the victim completes the actus reus of
the offence, the defendant will be liable for the victim’s actions because
they were simply an obvious response to the defendant’s behaviour.98 In
the leading case of R v Roberts,99 the appellant made advances towards a
girl in his car. When he tried to take her coat off it was the ‘last straw’
and she jumped from the vehicle despite it travelling at some speed. The
Court of Appeal said:
Was [the victim’s reaction] the natural result of what the alleged assailant
said or did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have
been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing? If the
victim does something so ‘daft’ or so unexpected that no reasonable man
could be expected to foresee it, then it is only in a very remote and unreal
sense a consequence of his assault.100
Similarly, in R v Williams and Davis,101 the defendants picked up a hitch-
hiker who jumped from their car and sustained fatal injuries when the
defendants demanded money from him. The Court of Appeal added to
Roberts that not only should the victim’s reaction be reasonably foresee-
able, but reasonable in nature depending on his or her characteristics
and circumstances: 
The jury should consider whether the deceased’s reaction in jumping from
the moving car was within the range of responses which might be expected
from a victim placed in the situation which he was. The jury should bear in
mind any particular characteristic of the victim and the fact that in the
agony of the moment he may act without thought and deliberation.102
To put Roberts and Williams into context with the facts of Dhaliwal,
consider that C and V are a Muslim couple who have been married for
several years, and that C has physically and emotionally abused V for the
best part of the marriage. One night C threatens V that he will burn her
with an iron if she fails to provide him with the money for the electric
bill the next day. Fearful of sustaining more injuries and shaming her
family through a divorce and depressed over the prospect of a lifetime of
violence, V runs in front of a truck the next day, killing herself. Taking
the ‘reasonably foreseen’ criteria from Roberts and the ‘particular charac-
teristics’ element from Williams, could a combination of V’s emotional
state of mind, her religious beliefs and her history of violence at the
hands of C bring V’s act of suicide into the range of ‘reasonable re-
sponses’ to C’s behaviour? Could this be regarded as a ‘quasi-causal link’
between C’s acts over a number of years and V’s death, which could only
be strengthened as a result of V’s religion, making her believe that
suicide is the ‘only way out’?103
98 See R v Dhaliwal [2006] Crim LR 923 at 926, comment by D. Ormerod, for further
discussion on the application of this doctrine to the Dhaliwal case.
99 (1971) 56 Cr App R 95.
100 Ibid. at 102, per Stephenson LJ.
101 (1992) 95 Cr App R 1.
102 Ibid. at 8, per Stuart-Smith LJ.
103 For further discussion on Dhaliwal and the victim’s state of mind, see J. Horder,
and L. McGowan, ‘Manslaughter by Causing Another’s Suicide’ [2006] Crim LR
1035 at 1041.
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The escape cases illustrate the correct use of the doctrine of causation
and sharply contrast to the narrow approach taken by the House of
Lords in Kennedy. According to escape cases, a break in the chain in
causation only happens when the victim’s free and deliberate act is
unforeseeable and outside the range of reasonable responses to the defendants
act. Although these cases are based on different facts, this basic causal
principle was neglected in Kennedy. Kennedy foresaw that the victim
would inject the heroin. The victim’s injection was also a reasonable
response to being handed a pre-prepared syringe. Thus, the causal
approach in escape cases conveys that the chain of causation should not
have been broken by the victim’s act. 
There are striking resemblances to be made between Carey and
Dhaliwal. Assuming (as the medical experts did) that Aimee’s running
away caused her heart to stop, according to Lawton LJ in Blaue, the
victim should be taken as found. It should not have mattered if Aimee
had a serious heart condition, the same as it did not matter that the
victim in Blaue was a Jehovah’s witness. Thus, Coyle’s unlawful act upon
Aimee could be said to have led to her death.104 Additionally, applying
the ‘reasonably foreseen’ criteria from Roberts and the ‘particular charac-
teristics’ element from Williams, could a combination of (a) Aimee’s
frightened state of mind, (b) the fact that she was only 15 years old, (c)
the fact that she was only yards from her home, and (d) the assault she
suffered on her face, bring her act of running away into the range of
reasonable responses to the defendant’s behaviour? It seems very likely.
The recent case of R v Johnstone105 illustrates how difficult it can be to
prove a causal link between the alleged criminal act and the death of the
deceased. In this case, a gang of youths caused the death of a 67-year-old
man who died of a heart attack shortly after they had thrown sticks and
stones at him and struck him on the head with at least one stone. There
was some doubt as to whether the victim’s arrhythmia (irregular heart
rhythm) that led to the heart attack was triggered by the unlawful and
dangerous assaults or whether it had already been triggered by earlier
behaviour from the defendants such as spitting and verbal abuse, which
may have been criminal but may not have been regarded as dangerous.
Although the combination of events was likely to have caused the fatal
bout of arrhythmia, it was impossible for the jury to conclude that the
earlier and less dangerous verbal abuse had not been the sole cause of
the heart attack.
The trial judge in Carey spoke of ‘probability’ and ‘proximity’ and an
‘overall’ cause. These terms are an example of a more generous applica-
tion of legal causation but they will produce a fairer outcome. According
to R v Smith106 a final cause is still a cause in law, even if it is only one of
104 Additionally, in R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692, the defendant remained liable
for manslaughter where he caused his victim to die by triggering a previously
undiagnosed medical condition. This is an observation by D. Ormerod in his
comment on R v Carey [2006] Crim LR 842 at 848, who supports the notion that
in Carey the option to use ‘victim’ cases was missed.
105 [2007] EWCA Crim 3133.
106 [1959] 2 QB 35.
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a number of operating causes.107 The fact that Dhaliwal’s final assault
and Kennedy’s supply of drugs and Coyle’s assault on Aimee could only
be understood to play a minor role in the victim’s death does not mean
that they did not contribute to the cause the death.
Conclusion
This article is not a rejection of the tried-and-tested principles of causa-
tion, but a criticism of the confused application of such principles to the
notoriously difficult area of unlawful act manslaughter. Why does the
victim’s act of injection in Kennedy108 break the chain of causation? In
Kennedy it cannot be disputed that the victim made an independent
choice to ‘administer’ the heroin himself, but this does not mean that
the defendant as facilitator played no part in the victim ‘taking’ the drug
or that any link between them had been broken. The Court of Appeal in
Dias admitted that even though the act of injection was not part of the
unlawful act, the injection was made possible by the unlawful posses-
sion and supply. The court also admitted that manslaughter cases could
be established in facts such as those in Kennedy as long as the jury are
satisfied that the chain of causation is not broken.109 Keene LJ’s further
guidance on the application of causation suggested that a jury must ask
themselves whether they are sure that the unlawful act was at least a
substantive cause of the victim’s death, as well as being dangerous.110
The House of Lords decision in Kennedy seems to ignore this advice and
focuses only on the victim’s act of administration as opposed to the
source of the fatal drug and the significant contribution from the facil-
itator, but if their Lordships argue that the victim’s act breaks the chain
of causation, are they at least admitting that there is a causal link?
As revealed above, according to escape cases and Rafferty,111 a break in
the chain in causation only happens when the victim’s free and deliber-
ate act is unforeseeable and outside the range of reasonable responses or
planned enterprise to the defendant’s act. Only when a defendant has no
idea what the end result of his act will be would it be unfair to place
blame on him. This was the rationale in Rafferty and it appears to be
logical, and it is certainly foreseeable in the facts of Kennedy that the
victim would inject himself with the prepared syringe. The Law Com-
mission in 2006112 suggested that unlawful act manslaughter should
take the form of ‘manslaughter’ on the third rung of their three-tier
homicide structure, proposing that where death was caused by a crim-
inal act intended to cause injury—or where the offender was aware that
the criminal act involved a serious risk of causing injury—he will be
107 Ibid. at 42–3, per Lord Parker CJ.
108 [2007] UKHL 38, [2007] 3 WLR 612.
109 [2002] 2 Cr App R 96 at [22] and [25], per Keene LJ.
110 Ibid. at [26].
111 [2007] EWCA Crim 1846.
112 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com. Report No. 304
(2006), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/lc_reports.htm#2006, accessed 4 August
2008.
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guilty of manslaughter.113 At first glance it can be seen how this provi-
sion could improve the law. A defendant would only be guilty of
‘criminal act’ manslaughter if when committing the criminal act he
intends to cause injury. However, the causation issue remains. If
Kennedy intended to cause his victim injury (or, at least thought that
injury was a virtually certain consequence) of his action, the same
dilemma would arise—did his unlawful act cause the death?
113 Ibid. at para. 1.38. Following on directly from the proposals in Law Commission,
Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter, Law Com Report No. 237
(1996), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/lc_reports.htm#2006, accessed 4 August
2008; and Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The
Government’s Proposals (2000), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/
cons-2005-corporate-manslaughter/2000-cons-invol-manslaughter.pdf?view=Binary,
accessed 4 August 2008.
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